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EXPLANATIONS/APOLOGIES 
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INTRODUCTION 
Medical malpractice law has been subjected to strong criticism by both 
medical and legal commentators.1  It has been challenged as inefficient,2 in-
accurate,3 and even counterproductive.4  Although many reforms have been 
proposed, most tend to benefit one group—either physicians or patients—to 
the exclusion of the other.  Professor Jeffrey O’Connell’s ―early offers‖ 
proposal provides a reform of the system that is beneficial to plaintiffs, de-





  Associate Professor of Law, Widener University.  Thanks to Jeffrey O’Connell, Jennifer Robben-
nolt, and Sheila Scheuerman for their perceptive input.  Thanks also to Diana Esposito for her excellent 
research assistance, and to members of the Northwestern University Law Review for their outstanding 
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1
  See, e.g., COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: 
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 5 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) (advocating a shift in emphasis 
away from blaming individual actors to improving the overall health care system); Paul C. Weiler, J.P. 
Newhouse & H.H. Hiatt, Proposal for Medical Liability Reform, 267 JAMA 2355 (1992) (advocating a 
no-fault approach to medical liability).   
2
  See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Mal-
practice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2031 (2006) (observing that plaintiffs recovered only 
46 cents of each dollar spent on their cases) (link).  
3
  See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1464 (2007) (noting 
that a review of all seven studies that have compared verdicts rendered in individual malpractice cases 
with independent evaluations of each claim by medical or legal experts determined that plaintiffs win 
between 10% and 20% of cases they should likely lose, but lose 50% of cases they should likely win) 
(link). 
4
  See, e.g., COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., supra note 1, at 43 (asserting that the 
blame culture deters physicians from disclosing errors). 
5
  O’Connell and I published a book about early offers last year.  JEFFREY O’CONNELL & 
CHRISTOPHER J. ROBINETTE, A RECIPE FOR BALANCED TORT REFORM: EARLY OFFERS WITH SWIFT 
SETTLEMENTS (2008).  In the book’s Foreword, we acknowledged that early offers may be better suited 
to some areas of tort law than others.  Id. at xi.  I endorse the application of early offers to medical mal-
practice suits, and much of the associated apology research focuses thereon.  See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, 
Can You Trust a Doctor You Can’t Sue?, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 303, 309 n.33 (2005) (arguing that ―scho-
larship on the need for law generally to facilitate apology often discusses medical malpractice cases as 
leading examples‖).  The integration of explanations and apologies into an early offers proposal is poss-
ible, however, in other contexts, such as products liability. 
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combining early offers with explanations of the incident6 or with apologies,7 
the idea has never received a focused analysis.  Recent scholarship on ex-
planations and apologies allows greater insight into the role they play in 
conflict resolution, and their importance to an early offers proposal in the 
field of medical malpractice.  This Essay considers such scholarship and 
explores the advantages of combining early offers with explanations of the 
incident and/or apologies. 
I. EARLY OFFERS 
The early offers proposal functions quite simply.  Under it, a medical 
malpractice defendant has the option to offer an injured claimant within a 
defined statutory period (for example, within 180 days of a claim) a settle-
ment of periodic payments.  In total, these payments would cover the clai-
mant’s net wage loss and medical expenses (including rehabilitation), plus a 
reasonable attorney’s feepresumptively 10% of the recovery, an amount 
that reflects the reduced legal load created by the shortened process.8  Pain 
and suffering is not included. 
The early offer option is totally voluntarydefendants are never 
forced to make an early offer, and, if no offer is made, traditional common-
law principles apply to both liability and damages.  If, however, the defen-
dant does make an early offer, that offer triggers strong incentives for the 
claimant: a claimant who declines an early offer will be subject to a higher 
burden of proof (either ―clear and convincing‖ or even ―beyond a reasona-
ble doubt‖), and the defendant will be held to a higher standard of miscon-
duct (―gross negligence‖), at trial. 
Despite its advantages, the early offers approach is not overly favora-
ble to healthcare providers.  First, only defendants willing to forgo obstruc-
tive defenses will be advantaged by the proposal.  In that vein, a defendant 
cannot game the system by making a lesser offer and then gain the advan-
tages of the early offer system.  Furthermore, once an early offer is ten-
dered, that can be seen as disciplining offerors by the transformation of the 
claim into a first-party one.  Unlike adversarial, third-party claims, the offe-
ror is subjected to more regulatory supervision by state insurance depart-
ments as well as claims based on bad faith for refusal to pay benefits.  
Second, defendants making early offers must still pay for victims’ (often 
substantial) net economic losses, thereby internalizing the cost of such acci-
dents.  The proposal could also include a minimum offer of $250,000 for 





  O’CONNELL & ROBINETTE, supra note 5, at 133; Jeffrey O’Connell & Patrick B. Bryan, More 
Hippocrates, Less Hypocrisy: “Early Offers” as a Means of Implementing the Institute of Medicine’s 
Recommendations on Malpractice Law, 15 J. L. & HEALTH 23, 47–48 (2001). 
7
  Jeffrey O’Connell, Jeremy Kidd, & Evan Stephenson, An Economic Model Costing “Early Of-
fers” Medical Malpractice Reform: Trading Noneconomic Damages for Prompt Payment of Economic 
Damages, 35 N.M. L. REV. 259, 269 n.24 (2005). 
8
  For a more detailed description, see O’CONNELL & ROBINETTE, supra note 5, at 123–134. 
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economic losses suffered are relatively small (for example, those by child-
ren, homemakers, or retirees).  Third, if no early offer is made, or if, despite 
receiving an offer, the claimant goes to trial and prevails, the claimant can 
recover for pain and suffering or even punitive damages.  This means that 
awards for noneconomic damages would be reserved for cases where the 
malpractice is egregious or where a recalcitrant defendant unwisely declines 
to make an early offer. 
Effectively, then, the early offer provides the claimant with the equiva-
lent of a major medical/disability policy that covers the claimant’s reasona-
ble net economic losses.  Injury victims tendered early offers would lose 
their recourse to full-scale, medical malpractice litigation, but they would 
also receive payment without the uncertainty, delay, and transaction costs 
they now face.  Moreover, the recourse to full-scale litigation is lost only if 
the defendant guarantees prompt payment compensating the malpractice li-
tigant for his economic losses plus attorney’s fees.  The defendant-
physician, on the other hand, protects herself from the vicissitudes of non-
economic damages in return for promptly offering to pay the claimant’s net 
economic damages. 
O’Connell, along with Professors Kip Viscusi and Joni Hersch, per-
formed a study of closed claim medical malpractice cases in Texas and 
Florida.  The authors analyzed how the system would have performed if an 
early offers law had been in effect.9  The savings, in both time and money, 
would be dramatic.  On average, the length of medical malpractice suits 
would be reduced by over two years per claim,10 and litigation costs alone 
reduced by between $100,000 and $200,000 per claim.11 
Thus, under the early offer proposal, claimants are compensated for 
their economic losses, including rehabilitation, much more promptly, with-
out the frustration of a long trial process and with considerably lower trans-
action costs.  Moreover, physicians are able to avoid arbitrary noneconomic 
damages and to spend less time preparing for litigation and more on patient 
care.  Finally, society benefits from the lower transaction costs.  Medical 
care should become more affordable, and courts should have more time 
available to hear other cases. 
II. EXPLANATIONS AND APOLOGIES 
Scholarship in the last decade has begun to focus on whether there are 
nonmonetary incentives that motivate claimants to file and settle cases.  
Claimants, particularly in medical malpractice cases, say they file suit for 





  Joni Hersch, Jeffrey O’Connell & W. Kip Viscusi, An Empirical Assessment of Early Offer 
Reform for Medical Malpractice, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S231 (2007) (link).  
10
  The average time between injury and resolution in medical malpractice cases is approximately 
five years.  Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 2031. 
11
  O’CONNELL & ROBINETTE, supra note 5, at 151 tbl. III. 
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the circumstances surrounding it,‖ (2) ―to prevent future injuries,‖ and (3) 
―to determine accountability.‖12  Professor Jonathan Todres elaborates: 
 
The cynical observer may think that an apology has limited 
value and that patients sue only for money.  However, em-
pirical research suggests otherwise.  A study published in 
the Lancet, the leading British medical journal, found that 
as many as 37% of medical malpractice plaintiffs reported 
that they would not have filed their lawsuits if their doctors 
had sincerely apologized instead of stone-walling . . . .  An 
apology facilitates patients’ emotional healing.  Access to 
information helps patients regain a sense of control and 
empowerment, as well as a voice in the process.13 
 
Thus, following an adverse medical event, patients want to communi-
cate with their physician and other healthcare providers.  Furthermore, phy-
sicians report a desire to interact with patients and even to apologize.14  
They are concerned, however, that such conduct will increase the possibility 
of legal liability15—generally, fault-admitting apologies are admissible to 
establish liability at trial.16  As Professor Jonathan Cohen states, ―Although 
a physician may wish to tell a patient when he has made a mistake, lawyers 
often order doctors to say nothing.‖17  
Both sides appear to desire the same thing, but the incentives provided 
by litigation tear them in opposite directions.  In his co-authored book, Sor-
ry Works!, Doug Wojcieszak writes a powerful, first-person account of the 






  Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know and Don’t Know About the Role of Apologies in Resolv-
ing Health Care Disputes, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2005).  Cf. Hall, supra note 5, at 309 (―Re-
search reveals that, often, what injured patients most desire are candid acknowledgements of medical 
errors, a sincere apology that conveys genuine remorse, and constructive steps toward corrective ac-
tions.‖); Michael B. Rainey, Kit Chan & Judith Begin, Characterized by Conciliation: Here’s How 
Business Can Use Apology to Diffuse Litigation, 26 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 131, 132 
(2008) (―Literature suggests the top three reasons for patients or their family members filing suit are (1) 
a lack of explanation of what happened, (2) the perception that no one takes responsibility for their ac-
tions, and (3) the demand that someone take measures to mitigate the offensive situation.‖) (link). 
13
  Jonathan Todres, Toward Healing and Restoration for All: Reframing Medical Malpractice 
Reform, 39 CONN. L. REV. 667, 686 (2006). 
14
  Robbennolt, supra note 12, at 1018 (citing Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ and Physicians’ 
Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001, 1003, 1004 & tbl. 2). 
15
  Id.  See also Todres, supra note 13, at 686 (―The litigation-based system . . . discourages apolo-
gies, thus hindering patients’ (and physicians’) healing.‖). 
16
  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (defining admissions by a party opponent as outside the hearsay 
exclusion) (link). 
17
  Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1999). 
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After the funeral and all the relatives and friends went 
home, my parents went back to the hospital seeking an-
swers, especially my father, the Ph.D. engineer.  “What 
happened?  Why did it happen?  Can the process be im-
proved so it never happens again?”  These were all ques-
tions my parents—especially my dad—had.  But the door 
was unceremoniously slammed in their face.  Meetings 
were promised, but did not transpire.  Even the surgeon 
who was so honest the night Jim died told my parents:  
“Look, our legal counsel has instructed me not to speak 
with you any further.  You will have to leave.”18 
 
Given the tension between the parties’ ―true‖ desires and the burdens 
and incentives associated with litigation, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
much of the relevant literature attempts to address this problem.  Professors 
Jonathan Cohen and Aviva Orenstein, independently and simultaneously, 
proposed one solution that has had significant impact: that apologies be ex-
cepted from the admissions doctrine.19  They both hypothesize that physi-
cians will be more willing to provide apologies if they are deemed inad-
inadmissible as evidence of liability, and that the free flow of communica-
tion between physicians and patients will thereby be encouraged.  For years, 
Massachusetts was the only state that provided immunity to certain types of 
apologies in this manner.20  Almost immediately after the articles by Cohen 
and Orenstein were published, however, apologies became a public policy 
issue in many jurisdictions.  In the decade following the work of Cohen and 
Orenstein, thirty-four additional states passed some form of apology im-
munity.21 
The academic proposals and state laws created in their wake have 





  DOUG WOJCIESZAK, JAMES W. SAXTON & MAGGIE M. FINKELSTEIN, SORRY WORKS!: 
DISCLOSURE, APOLOGY, AND RELATIONSHIPS PREVENT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 5 (2007). 
19
  See Cohen, supra note 17, at 1061–64; Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Fe-
minist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 221, 223–24 
(1999). 
20
  MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (LexisNexis 2000) (―Statements, writings or benevolent ges-
tures expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or death of a 
person involved in an accident and made to such person or to the family of such person shall be inad-
missible as evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action.‖) (link).  This statute, passed in 1986, 
has a touching history.  See Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE 
L.J. 1135, 1151 (2000) (explaining that the nation’s first apology-immunity law arose out of the death of 
a legislator’s daughter). 
21
  See Sorry Works! Coalition Website, http://www.sorryworks.net/lawdoc.phtml (last visited Apr. 
22, 2009) (link); see also WOJCIESZAK ET AL., supra note 18, app. A, at 111–12 (listing state apology 
immunity statutes). 
22
  One response to these and related debates is the search for empirical data, primarily by Professor 
Jennifer Robbennolt.  See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical 
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whether to protect ―full‖ apologies or merely ―expressions of sympathy and 
benevolence.‖23  Full apologies acknowledge responsibility, whereas ex-
pressions of benevolence merely express sympathy.  The vast majority of 
apology-immunity statutes only protect expressions of benevolence, allow-
ing admission of fault-acknowledging apologies to prove liability.  Limiting 
immunity to expressions of benevolence creates a line-drawing problem: At 
what point has the speaker crossed the line from expressing sympathy to 
admitting fault?24 
Second, scholars have debated the consequences of apology immunity.  
An apology may dissuade claimants from suing in the first place, and aca-
demics question whether that end is a good thing.25  On the one hand, a 
claimant voluntarily forbearing a suit prevents inefficient, time-consuming, 
and often painful litigation.  On the other hand, if someone has been injured 
as a result of negligence, an apology may be inadequate considerationin 
other words, they think that if someone is truly sorry, she should pay for the 
harm she has caused. 
And third, there exists a related debate over whether immunizing apol-
ogies creates incentives for purely strategic behavior and deprives apologies 
of their moral significance.26  Arguably, immunized apologies will entice 
defendants to apologize, regardless of their sincerity, because there is no 
cost to doing so.  If, as often occurs, the claimant feels more favorably to-
ward the defendant, the claimant may forgo litigation.  If, on the other hand, 
the apology does not change the claimant’s attitude, it is inadmissible.  Fur-
thermore, an apology, absent the willingness to make further reparations, 
can be seen as hollow.27   
Fortunately, the context of early offers provides a way to sidestep these 
debates, and to take full advantage of the benefits of explanations and apol-
ogies. 
III. SYNERGY 
The apology research demonstrates the wisdom of requiring malprac-
tice defendants to include an offer to meet with the claimant as part of the 
early offer.  The offer to meet would be included with the compensatory 
                                                                                                                           
Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 492–99 (2003) (distinguishing effects of apologies based on fac-
tors such as severity of injury, strength of liability evidence, and thoroughness of apology); Jennifer K. 
Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349 (2008) 
(distinguishing effect of apologies on attorneys and clients) (link); Robbennolt, supra note 12. 
23
  Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 871 
(2002).  See, e.g., id. at 847 (―If the injurer is truly sorry, shouldn’t he pay for what he has done? . . . .  
What these laws do is promote insincere apologies between people.  They cheapen the meaning of an 
apology.‖).  For a thorough summary of the pros and cons of both approaches, see id. at 871–72.   
24
  See id. at 837–38. 
25
  Id. at 845–47. 
26
  See Taft, supra note 20, at 1138. 
27
  Id.; Lee Taft, On Bended Knee (With Fingers Crossed), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 601 (2006). 
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part of the comprehensive settlement proposal.  Accordingly, the physician 
would not be required to attend such a meeting unless the claimant has de-
cided to accept the compensatory offer.  At the meeting, the physician 
would be required to explain why (in his or her opinion) the claimant’s in-
jury occurred.  The physician would also have to explain what additional 
steps, if any, are necessary to prevent similar injuries from occurring in the 
future.  Finally, the physician should have the opportunity to apologize.  
Because of free-speech protections, court-ordered apologies are not legal in 
the United States.28  Furthermore, a coerced apology would carry very little 
weight with the claimant.  Because evidence suggests that in many cases 
physicians would like to apologize to claimants,29 however, it is reasonable 
to assume that many of them would take this opportunity to do so. 
As far as it can be mandated, therefore, the meeting offer will provide 
claimants with the three things that apology research has determined they 
desire.30  First, the required explanation will help claimants understand their 
injury and the circumstances surrounding it.  Physicians are already re-
quired to provide this information during the adjudication process, but the 
atmosphere in litigation is rarely one of candor.  Attorneys frequently ad-
vise their clients that while they should answer deposition and trial ques-
tions, they should never volunteer information.  Under the proposal, more 
information is likely to be provided sooner and in a less hostile manner.  
Second, physicians will have to inform the claimant what steps are being 
taken to prevent future injuries.  The process of explaining the injury and 
describing whatever preventive steps are being taken are beneficial to the 
claimant.  Moreover, these steps should, in themselves, assist in deterring 
medical errors.  Litigation has a chilling effect on the access to information 
about medical errors.31  Yet experts in patient safety identify disclosure of 
such information as crucial to improving the quality of health care.32  When 
physicians focus on explaining what happened, as opposed to defending 
their conduct from liability, they are likely to provide the information 
needed to correct and prevent errors.  Thus the explicit requirement to dis-
cuss corrective steps, as opposed to deny and defend, reinforces the preven-
tive effort.  Finally, the information provided will help the claimant 
determine accountabilityparticularly if the physician is given the oppor-
tunity to apologize.  Given the general desire among physicians to apolog-





  Cohen, supra note 17, at 1018 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 
U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that the freedom of speech protects against compulsory speech) (link). 
29
  See supra text accompanying note 14. 
30
  See supra text accompanying note 12. 
31
  See COMM. ON QUALITY HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: 
A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 218–19 (2001) (link). 
32
  Id. at 122. 
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to be responsible for a claimant’s injuries should take this opportunity to do 
so.  These apologies will assist in claimants’ ―emotional healing.‖33 
The early offers meeting requirement also bypasses the three conten-
tious issues in the apology literature.  First, there is no need to determine 
whether it is preferable to immunize statements of benevolence or full apol-
ogies, or how to draw the line between the two.  Because the opportunity to 
apologize is part of a comprehensive settlement, there is no need to offer 
immunity.  The claim is being resolved, and there will be no litigation.  
Second, there is no concern that an apology will influence a claimant to re-
linquish a claim for compensation.  If a physician makes an apology, it will 
be after compensation for the claimant’s economic losses has been offered 
and accepted.  For the same reason, there is no concern that physicians will 
apologize strategically.  Although the explanation portion of my meeting 
proposal is mandatory, it can be seen as part of the consideration for settle-
ment.  The apology, which is left to the physician’s discretion, cannot.  
There is therefore no reason to think physicians’ post-resolution apologies 
will be insincere. 
CONCLUSION 
Early offers provide a balanced reform of the maligned medical mal-
practice system.  Recent research into alternative methods of dispute resolu-
tion demonstrates how important explanations and apologies are to injured 
claimants.  In particular, many claimants desire to understand their injury 
and how it occurred, to determine accountability, and to prevent future 
similar injuries.  Early offers, when combined with an in-person meeting 
requirement, can help patients achieve these goals.  Requiring physicians to 
offer to meet with claimants to explain the injury, describe preventive steps 
being taken, and perhaps apologize, would help claimants with the healing 
process.  It would also allow physicians the opportunity to apologize, which 






  Todres, supra note 13, at 686. 
